Traffic flow splitting from crowdsourced digital route choice support by Storch, David-Maximilian et al.
Traffic flow splitting from crowdsourced digital route choice support
David-Maximilian Storch,1, 2 Malte Schro¨der,1, 2 and Marc Timme1, 2, 3
1Chair for Network Dynamics, Center for Advancing Electronics Dresden (cfaed),
Technical University of Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany
2Institute for Theoretical Physics, Technical University of Dresden, 01062 Dresden, Germany
3Lakeside Labs, Lakeside B04b, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria
(Dated: August 12, 2020)
Digital technology is fundamentally transforming human mobility. Route choices in particular are
greatly affected by the availability of traffic data, increased connectivity of data sources and cheap
access to computational resources. Digital routing technologies promise more efficient route choices
for the individual and a reduction of congestion for cities. Yet, it is unclear how widespread adoption
of such technologies actually alters the collective traffic flow dynamics on complex street networks.
Here, we answer this question for the dynamics of urban commuting under digital route choice
support. Building on the class of congestion games we study the evolution of commuting behavior
as a fraction of the population relies on, but also contributes to, crowdsourced traffic information.
The remainder of the population makes their route choices based on personal experience. We show
how digital route choice support may cause a separation of commuter flows into technology and non-
technology users along different routes. This collective behavior may fuel systemic inefficiencies and
lead to an increase of congestion as a consequence. These results highlight new research directions
in the field of algorithmic design of route choice decision support protocols to help fight congestion,
emissions and other systemic inefficiencies in the course of increasing urbanization and digitization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past decade, the smartphone has become a
daily companion to as many as 2.71 billion people around
the globe [1]. Its vast supply of mobile applications offers
software solutions that connect people, provide informa-
tion and simplify many tasks of every-day life.
In mobility in particular, the smartphone has become
an indispensable tool that reshapes the way people get
from A to B [2–5]: It enables new forms of mobility ser-
vices (e.g. ride-sharing, e-hailing, car-sharing) [6–10],
easy and transparent access to information (e.g. pub-
lic transport schedules, street maps, real-time traffic up-
dates) [11], as well as decision support in situations under
uncertainty (e.g. route choice recommendations) [12].
Despite the widespread adoption of smartphone tech-
nology for mobility services, little is known theoretically
about the mechanisms of how phone-based mobility ap-
plications modify the collective dynamics of complex mo-
bility systems [5, 13]. Here, we focus on mobile applica-
tions offering route choice recommendations in traffic sit-
uations under uncertainty [14]: In those situations, route
choice applications provide their users with valuable traf-
fic updates (otherwise unavailable to them) and advise
them on how to navigate the local environment (e.g. de-
scribed by a street network) ideally to minimize expected
travel times [15], volatility [16], or environmental harm
[17, 18].
Research on route choice behavior has helped to char-
acterize the impact of selfish routing on travel times and
the emergence of congestion [19–22]. Recent availabil-
ity of massive amounts of traffic data has enabled the
investigation of traffic assignment and network flows in
real cities to complement theoretical efficiency bounds
[23, 24].
It is easy to imagine that app-based routing informa-
tion as well as smart mode and route suggestions may
help to overcome the negative effects of selfish routing
and benefit all traffic participants. Even without dedi-
cated measurements, crowdsourced information may pro-
vide a very accurate picture of the current and average
traffic conditions [25]. Yet, studies on mobility systems
with digital route choice support have mostly focused on
their potential efficiency, technical implementation and
their computational performance [26] with limited em-
phasis on the induced collective traffic assignment dy-
namics [5, 12]. However, given the complex interplay of
route suggestions, actual route choices and street net-
work, it is far from clear how the global state of traf-
fic actually responds to widespread use of digital route
choice support.
In this article, we address this issue for the dynamics
of urban commuting. We propose a reformulation of con-
gestion games [24, 28] driven by an adaptive payoff-based
learning rule [29] where heterogeneous population shares
subscribe to a digital route choice support service, while
others rely on personal commuting experience. We inte-
grate a digital platform operator who provides mode and
route choice recommendations based on traffic informa-
tion crowdsourced from his subscribers (see Fig. 1). Com-
muters balance between following his advice, or relying
on their personal experience in making a route choice.
We demonstrate the emergence of flow separation into
groups of technology and non-technology users along dif-
ferent routes of the street network, stimulated by the col-
lective sharing of crowdsourced traffic information. Fur-
thermore, we highlight how flow splitting may contribute
to inefficient use of available street capacity and increase
the overall travel time for the population.
Our results promise new insights into technology-
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FIG. 1. Digital decision support changes route choice behavior. a, Without digital decision support commuters only
rely on their personal learning about the performance of different routing options. In a daily repeated cycle, they select a route
(1), commute to their destinations (2), observe and learn the travel time along their chosen routes (3). Their observations and
learnings serve as a foundation for future route choices. b, With digital decision support commuters integrate crowdsourced
traffic information from their fellow travelers (shading) on top of their personal learning. Before embarking on a trip, commuters
consult their routing apps for route choice advise (0), select a route conditional on the information obtained and their personal
experience (1), commute to their destinations (2), observe and learn which routes perform best (3). Fully automated, commuters
share information on their latest travel times with the digital platform provider (crowdsourcing) to update and improve the
quality of the recommendations of the digital decision support tool [27].
enabled traffic assignment on complex mobility systems.
Not only do the results show that informational nudges
influence individual route choices, but also how they im-
pact the overall state of traffic. As Mobility-as-a-Service
platforms become more and more common, our results
highlight further research directions in designing route
choice support protocols that reduce congestion, emis-
sions or other forms of systemic inefficiencies, instead of
fueling them.
II. URBAN COMMUTING UNDER DIGITAL
ROUTE CHOICE SUPPORT
In the following, we introduce the basic notation for
the congestion game used to analyze the commuting dy-
namics in urban environments under digital route choice
support. First, we define the urban environment that
is inhabited by two groups of commuters – technology
users and non-technology users – who have a daily recur-
ring commuting demand to travel between fixed origin-
destination pairs. Second, we present the commuters’
route choice problem and show how digital decision sup-
port modifies the route choice dynamics. Third, we detail
how a digital platform operator crowdsources traffic ob-
servations to provide commuters with smart mode and
route choice recommendations.
A. Urban environment
We formalize the urban commuting dynamics in terms
of flows on a network. A graph defines the urban street
network which flows materialize on. A set of latency
functions governs the street network’s resilience to con-
gestion.
Consider the street network to be described by the
graph G = (V, E), whose edges E = {1, 2, . . . , E} denote
street segments and nodes V = {1, 2, . . . , V } correspond
to intersections. Assume streets e ∈ E to be common
pool resources [30] which are equipped with a latency
function ce : N → R each. The latency function deter-
mines the duration of travel along the street segment. It
is a monotonously increasing function of the vehicle flow
fe ∈ N, and formalizes the street segment’s resilience to
congestion [31]. Common edge latency functions are of
polynomial form [32], e.g.
ce(fe) = c0
(
1 +Be
(
fe
f0
)4)
, (1)
where c0 is the free flow latency, f0 ∈ N denotes an ef-
fective capacity that governs the onset of congestion and
Be ≥ 0. If the product c0Be → 0 an edge reduces to a
common good that is non-rivalrous in consumption and
resilient to congestion. Else, the edge’s latency rises sub-
stantially as fe approaches or exceeds f0.
3In this setting, distribute an urban population N =
{1, 2, . . . , N} on G, and assume that each individual
i ∈ N has a daily commuting demand Di = {o, d} to
travel from some origin o ∈ V to some destination d ∈ V.
Without loss of generality, we require o 6= d.
B. Commuter perspective
Every day, the population participates in a congestion
game. Each commuter i ∈ N tries to find an ideal route
that minimizes her personal travel time while accommo-
dating her mobility demand Di [28, 33]. Therefore, com-
muters choose one of Si routes from their finite strategy
profiles Si = {p1i , p2i , . . . , pSii }. The elements of Si cor-
respond to directed paths on G connecting the origin-
destination pair Di and may be partially overlapping.
Each routing option psi ∈ Si yields a travel time Φis ,
defined in terms of the total latency
∑
e∈psi ce along
the path corresponding to individual i’s strategy s ∈
{1, 2, . . . , Si}. However, at the time of decision-making
commuters typically do not know about the edge flows
fe, e ∈ E , and latencies to be realized that day. For
them, the quantities are random variables, rendering it
highly non-trivial to anticipate which route will be the
fastest. Some routes may seem short in terms of dis-
tance, but may turn out to be heavily congested. Others
might seem long, but may be less utilized by the pop-
ulation. Hence, commuters face a decision problem on
how to navigate an urban environment with stochastic
latencies most efficiently.
1. Strategic interaction
Commuters interact through increased travel times
when they use the same streets. Beyond these di-
rect, traffic-mediated interactions between commuters,
technology-based route choice support introduces addi-
tional indirect interactions, for example due to collec-
tive sharing of crowdsourced traffic information. These
higher-order interactions also affect non-technology users
through their direct interaction with technology users.
Independent of technology support, direct interactions
between commuters can be classified according to three
categories, depending on their mutual strategic routing
options. The overlap in routing options introduces a
strategic interaction between the participants of the ur-
ban commuting game, caused by the rivalry for low la-
tency street segments which are non-excludable.
• Identical strategy profiles. Identical origin-
destination pairs Di = Dj , i, j ∈ N , have the same
routing options to complete their daily trips such
that the strategies psi and p
s
j correspond to the same
path onG. Hence, identical origin-destination pairs
may be envisaged as identical species of commuter
profiles that are likely to travel along the same
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FIG. 2. Formalizing route choice decisions. The
street network’s topology, latency structure and the origin-
destination distribution define a strategic interaction between
commuters. a, Strategy profiles for three exemplary OD-pairs
({A → D,B → D,C → D}) in a four-edge graph. The first
strategy profile contains two routing strategies while the other
two contain a single option only. b, Transpose of the edge-
strategy incidence matrix IT for five exemplary commuters
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}. For example, commuter 1 needs to travel
from A to D. Hence, she has two strategies in her strategy
profile S1 (yellow). Her first strategy (dotted) includes travel
along edges {1, 2} ⊂ E , denoted as ones in the edge-strategy
incidence matrix (blue shading), but excludes other edges,
denoted as zeros. Her second strategy (dashed) follows edges
{3, 4} ⊂ E , corresponding to ones in the third and fourth col-
umn of the edge-strategy incidence matrix, but no non-zero
entries otherwise. Note that the incidence matrix duplicates
paths on G as different strategies if they correspond to differ-
ent individuals.
routes. When doing so, they increase each others’
travel times.
• Intersecting strategy profiles. Commuters with dif-
ferent origin-destination pairs Di 6= Dj , i, j ∈ N ,
might still have significant overlap in terms of joint
street segments along the different routing options
in their strategy profiles. Depending on their re-
spective route choices, they might meet along se-
lected street segments and influence each other’s
travel times.
• Disjoint strategy profiles. In contrast, different
origin-destination pairs Di 6= Dj , i, j ∈ N , can also
imply disjoint strategy profiles. In this case, com-
muters do not meet along the streets on G. Their
respective travel times are not directly dependent
on one another.
The congestion game may be envisaged as a complex
many-body system consisting of heterogeneous commuter
species who are defined by their unique sets of strategy
profiles. Depending on the degree of overlap between
4their strategies, the system mediates a strong repulsive
coupling between the different specimen.
Typically, commuters have no knowledge about which
person refers to which of the three categories. They may
only infer information on the statistical properties of the
origin-destination distribution based on their travel time
observations.
a. Edge-strategy incidence matrix. To formalize the
information on strategies and graph topology, we de-
fine the edge-strategy incidence matrix I. It is a linear
map from the joint space of strategies S = ∪i∈NSi =
{p11, . . . , pS11 , p12, . . . , pSNN } to edge space E , defined by
Ie,is =
{
1, if e ∈ psi , psi ∈ S
0, otherwise.
(2)
Fig. 2 shows an illustrative example of how I is con-
structed from both E and S.
To investigate the day-to-day dynamics of urban com-
muting we consider constant I, i.e. stationary graph
topology and origin-destination demands since the com-
muting dynamics happens on much faster timescales.
Typically, the graph’s topology or commuting demand
patterns evolve on timescales of months or years (e.g.
upon infrastructural reconstruction in the urban area or
urbanizaton effects such as im-, emigration or sprawl),
thereby only slowing modulating G and S compared to
the day-to-day level.
2. Route choice
Denote by asi = 1 person i’s choice for route p
s
i ∈
Si, implying a decision against her strategic alternatives,
namely ari = 0 for all r ∈ Si\{psi}. For each person
i ∈ N , let esi be the unit vector pointing in the direction
of her route s within the joint strategy space of all players
S. Denote the population’s collective route choice a ∈
{0, 1}|S| by
a =
∑
i∈N
ai =
∑
i∈N
Si∑
s=1
asie
s
i , (3)
with one entry of ai being one and all others being zero.
Note that even players traveling along identical routes
will have different ai since e
s
i points towards a player-
specific strategy on the joint space of all strategies S.
Collective route choices a fully determine the system
state and translate into edge flows
f =
∑
e∈E
feee = Ia, (4)
via the edge-strategy incidence matrix I. Here, ee de-
notes the unit vector pointing in the direction of edge
e ∈ E .
Let C : N|E| → R|E| be the operator mapping edge
flows to latencies via
C(f) =
∑
e∈E
ce(fe) · ee. (5)
It defines the trip duration performance map
Φ(a) = ITC(Ia) ∈ R|S| (6)
which assigns a travel time to each routing option psi ∈
S, i ∈ N for given collective action a.
3. Adaptive payoff-based learning dynamics without digital
route choice support
Commuters use the trip duration performance map
Eqn. (6) to determine an optimal route choice ai,t on day
t. However, they do not know how the other commuters
will decide that day (a−i,t =
∑
j∈N\{i} aj,t), nor do they
have information on the others’ strategy profiles to infer
a best response. Hence, at is a random variable to them,
and so is the travel time of their routing options. To deal
with this uncertainty, commuters form beliefs about the
expected trip duration of their strategies based on past
experience. Thereby, they learn which of their routing
options, on average, are best aligned with their objective
to reduce commuting time. The evolution of travel time
beliefs follows an adaptive payoff-based learning rule [29],
which consists of an iterated three-step cycle:
1. Select route: Commuters choose a route from their
strategy profiles based on their personal travel time
beliefs from past observations.
2. Commute: Commuters travel to their final desti-
nation along the chosen route for a duration deter-
mined by the travel time performance map.
3. Observe and learn: Commuters update the travel
time belief corresponding to their route choice.
Fig. 1a shows an illustrative visualization of this timing.
1. Select route. Denote by xsi,t commuter i’s travel
time belief for Φ(at) ·esi for route s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Si} before
embarking on their trip on date t. The population’s joint
belief vector can be written as
xt =
∑
i∈N
xi,t =
∑
i∈N
Si∑
s=1
xsi,t · esi . (7)
It evolves in time and governs the realization of the collec-
tive route choice. In line with the human choice model
[34, 35], beliefs xt at time t translate into commuter-
specific mixed strategy profiles
pii,t =
Si∑
s=1
pisi,te
s
i =
Si∑
s=1
e−βix
s
i,t∑Si
r=1 e
−βixri,t
esi (8)
5via a Boltzmann distribution. Here, pisi,t denotes the
probability for i to select route s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Si}. βi ∈
R+0 interpolates between purely opportunistic (βi → ∞)
and uniformly random (βi → 0) behavior.
The joint population’s mixed strategy profile is defined
by
pit =
∑
i∈N
pii,t. (9)
2. Commute. Each day t, all commuters make their
route choice for an s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Si} by realizing the
random variable ai,t according to pii,t. Afterwards
they start to travel along the chosen route from their
respective origin to their destination. The flows f
materialize instantaneously along the edges of G.
3. Observe and learn. Commuters observe travel times
as specified in Eqn. (6). Upon completion of the trip,
they compare xt and Φ(at) and update their beliefs ac-
cording to
xt+1 − xt = diag (at) [Φ(at)− xt] (10)
= diag (at)
[
ITC [Iat]− xt
]
. (11)
This mimics an iterated learning process, where discrep-
ancies Φ(at) − xt between beliefs xt and actual travel
times Φ(at) that day induce a belief correction. However,
commuters will only update the beliefs for the routes
that they have actually traveled along and where they
were able to make a travel time observation [projector
diag(at) in Eqn. (11)]. The resulting prior belief in game
stage t + 1 modifies the mixed strategy profile and the
commuting game repeats itself.
4. Digital route choice support
The widespread availability of smartphone-based route
choice support applications modifies the adaptive payoff-
based learning dynamics from Eqn. (11), and defines an
indirect interaction. The applications provide commuters
with traffic information and thereby modify their users’
mixed strategy profiles. Besides updating travel time be-
liefs solely based on personal observations, commuters
increasingly rely on additional traffic updates from their
apps before embarking on their daily commute. Such
updates typically come in the form of travel time perfor-
mance signals τ t ∈ R|S| along different routing options
on G. The signals enable their receivers to make a more
informed decision on how to navigate the urban traffic
most effectively. Informational signals induce an addi-
tional belief update (consult routing app) in the decision
cycle shown in Fig. 1b:
0. Consult routing app: Commuters consult a digital
decision support tool prior to making a route
choice to calibrate their travel time beliefs.
The subsequent steps 1-3 are identical to pure payoff-
based adaptive learning explained in the previous
section, apart from sharing personal travel time in-
formation with the digital platform provider in step
3 (crowdsourcing). The commuters’ additional belief
update from consulting the mobile application modifies
the formation of mixed strategy profiles pit and impacts
all subsequent steps:
0. Consult routing app. Assume commuter i ∈ N uses
a route choice app in her day-to-day commute. Her travel
time belief at time t is defined by Eqn. (11). It reflects her
last commuting experiences. To benefit from the app’s
capability to monitor the statistical performance of large
sets of routes at the same time, she tests how well her
personal beliefs are calibrated with the signal τ i,t she
receives. She determines the difference between the two,
τ i,t − xi,t,
and updates her travel time beliefs accordingly dis-
counted by the scalar parameter κi ∈ [0, 1]. κi deter-
mines to what extent a person conditions her beliefs on
the mobile applications’ signal, or her personal experi-
ence. κi = 0 implies that she ignores the tools’ input,
while κi = 1 indicates full replacement of personal ob-
servations by the tools’ recommendations. Empirical ev-
idence suggests significant trust, i.e. large κi [36, 37].
The learning dynamics under digital decision support becomes a superposition of both the personal experience
contribution, as well as the integration of the decision support tools’ signals
xt+1 − xt = (1− κ) diag(at) [Φ(at)− xt] + κ [τ t+1 − xt] . (12)
In this notation, κ =
∑
i∈N
∑Si
s=1 κi ·es
T
i e
s
i is the diagonal matrix whose entries bundle the individual trust parameters
of the different commuters. Note that setting κi = 0 corresponds to not using the decision support tool for the
corresponding individual. Therefore, it becomes possible to study the impact of heterogeneous groups of technology
and non-technology users on the urban commuting dynamics by composing the κ-matrix accordingly (as we will detail
in the following).
C. Digital platform operator perspective
Let there be a digital platform operator who curates
the digital route choice support tool that provides the
population with route choice recommendations. The tool
6is built around a statistical model on the latency of the
mobility system that is continuously being updated to
generate better traffic forecasts. Commuters can request
route choice recommendations based on this model
free of charge, but they agree to provide the platform
operator with spatiotemporal movement data on their
commuting behavior and travel time performance every
time they utilize the routing service. This process of
data aggregation is called crowdsourcing [38] and enables
the platform provider to collect massive amounts of
traffic observations in a single game stage to improve his
statistical model (in contrast to individual commuters
who learn based on their private observations only).
a. Crowdsourcing. Let T ⊂ N , |T | = T, be the
subset of the commuter population that consults their
smartphone applications before a route choice (κi ≥ 0
for all i ∈ T ). The remainder of the population, A =
N\T , |A| = A, does not apply any technology support
(κi = 0, i ∈ A). T shares their individual travel time
observations with the digital platform operator. That
means, the provider receives information about the sub-
set of edge flow realizations,
fTt = Rtft, (13)
that technology users have traveled along on day t.
Here, Rt denotes the flow projector that projects onto
the subset of edges in E which have been traveled along
by members within T . Note that Rt is constructed from
the joint action vector of technology users and thus
evolves as a random variable in time, too. Depending on
the composition of origin-destination pairs within T , a
small group of technology users is typically sufficient to
crowdsource flow data about a large fraction of edges in
E [25].
b. Signal construction. The platform operator acts
as a social planner whose strategy it is to develop a re-
fined statistical model of the typical edge latency on G.
He updates the model continuously based on the crowd-
sourced data received by his subscribers T . Similar to the
learning dynamics assumed for commuters, let this model
be within the class of exponential moving averages. That
means, it is a weighted superposition of latest data points
fTt at time t and old observations f
T
t−k, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K},
τ t+1 = αΦ(f
T
t ) + (1− α)τ t (14)
= αIT
K∑
k=0
(1− α)kC(fTt−k), (15)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the model keeps memory of
its past, but the memory is suppressed exponentially.
Each day t, the platform operator updates the model in
Eqn. (15) and makes it accessible to his subscribers T as
a travel time performance signal in the decision support
tool [compare Eqn. (12)].
III. RESULTS
In this section, we characterize the collective dynam-
ics of urban commuting with crowdsourced route choice
support introduced in the previous section. First, we
illustrate how crowdsourced decision support yields a
separation of commuter flows into technology and non-
technology users for strongly opportunistic route choice
behavior. Second, we demonstrate how this flow split-
ting fuels systemic inefficiencies. Third, we unveil how
the collective sharing of traffic information may stimu-
late congestion and leave certain routes unused for long
timescales.
A. Pigou example
In the following, we analyze a minimal model street
network G consisting of a single OD-pair whose origin
and destination nodes (O and D) are connected via two
routes 1 and 2 (see Fig. 3b). In this system, commuters
draw from homogeneous strategy profiles Si = {1, 2} for
all i ∈ N . Let the latency structure on G be given by
c1(f1) =
(
f1
f0
)4
, c2(f2) = 1, (16)
where f0 ∈ R+ controls the flow capacity along route 1
(see section II A). As shown by Pigou and Roughgarden
the combination of fixed and variable latency routing op-
tions creates strong incentives for road users to travel
along route 1 if f0 is sufficiently large, but does not set-
tle into a socially optimal user equilibrium [39, Ch. VIII
§4][40]. On this network define the adaptive payoff-based
learning dynamics with crowdsourced traffic information
specified in Eqn. (12).
In Fig. 3 we illustrate the resulting commuting dynam-
ics for a population of N = 1000 people which of a subset
T ⊂ N subscribes to the decision support service. We
contrast both situations where T = ∅ (Fig. 3 top row)
and T 6= ∅ (Fig. 3 bottom row). For T 6= ∅, we assume
homogeneous κi = 0.5 for all i ∈ T and κi = 0 for all
i ∈ A. Moreover, we assume homogeneous route choice
preferences βi ≡ β for all i ∈ N .
Observation 1 (Separation of flows). The presence of
crowdsourced digital route choice support yields a sepa-
ration of flows into technology users and non-technology
users across the two routing options, depending on the
route choice preferences β.
In Fig. 3, we show the relative flow time series
{fX1,t/X}Mt=1, M ∈ N along route 1 normalized by group
size X, namely X = T for technology users and X = A
for non-technology users. We contrast the relative flow
evolution with and without decision support for β = 1.5
and β = 4.5.
For T = ∅ and β = 1.5 the commuter flow along route
1 relaxes to a value slightly below the threshold capacity
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FIG. 3. Crowdsourced traffic information causes flow separation. b, In the Pigou network, consisting of a single
OD-pair connected by two routes, the population’s traffic assignment changes from the state without decision support (top)
to the state with decision support (bottom), where two qualitatively different regimes exist. a, d, For β < βcrit. technology
and non-technology users equally contribute to the relative commuter flow (flow normalized by the respective group size) of
the different routes. Qualitatively, the flow dynamics corresponds to the situation without digital decision support. c, f,
For β > βcrit. the total flow of commuters (N ) splits into technology (T ) and non-technology users (A). Technology users
effectively dominate route 1 and displace non-technology users onto route 2. In the absence of digital decision support no such
behavior can be observed. Bold lines depict moving averages of 25 time steps window size. e, The flow separation persists in
user equilibrium and intensifies for larger values of β. Simulation parameters are N = 1000, T = 700, f0 = 700, α = 0.5 (see
Supplementary Material for details).
f0 (see Fig. 3a, dashed) and is subject to minor fluc-
tuations. As β increases (see Fig. 3c) the fluctuations
increase significantly (see Supplementary Material for de-
tails), whereas the long-time average (denoted in terms of
a moving average) hints at stationary expectation values
for both regimes of route choice preferences. Commuters
evolve into a state where they use up all capacity f0 along
route 1 up to some buffer that absorbs natural fluctua-
tions. That way, commuters avoid overloading route 1
which would become congested otherwise.
For T 6= ∅ we assume T = f0 = 700 and homogeneous
technology trust κ = 0.5 for technology users. Fig. 3d
shows even contribution to the relative flow along route
1 from both commuter groups for β = 1.5:
〈fT1 〉/T ≈ 〈fA1 〉/A (17)
Crowdsourced route choice support does not alter the
dynamics observed for T = ∅.
For β = 4.5, however, flows evolve qualitatively differ-
ent with and without technology support. The relative
flow contribution of the two commuter groups separates.
T has a significantly higher relative contribution to f1,t
compared to A (see Fig. 3f):
〈fT1 〉/T > 〈fA1 〉/A (18)
Hence, technology users make use of the majority of the
available capacity along the street segment and displace
non-technology users onto the fixed latency route 2. The
phenomenon persists and lasts beyond the transient.
Fig. 3e demonstrates that flow separation emerges
upon exceeding a critical value of β and intensifies the
more opportunistic the population’s route choice behav-
ior is. Simulations indicate that the critical value of β is
always close to two, but is modulated by the parameters
of the model (see Supplementary Material for details).
Observation 2 (Heterogeneity in mixed strategy pro-
files). Flow separation emerges from heterogeneously dis-
tributed mixed strategy profiles between technology and
non-technology users.
Fig. 4 shows the distribution of mixed strategy pro-
files in the commuter population of technology and non-
technology users.
For β = 1.5 all commuters’ individual mixed strategy
profiles cluster at pi1 = (f0 − )/N (where  > 0 cor-
responds to the spare capacity that commuters leave to
absorb natural route choice fluctuations), independent
of technology use or not, explaining the long-time aver-
ages in Fig. 3d that fluctuate around this value. Quali-
tatively, technology and non-technology users behave the
same and can be approximated identical in a meanfield
description (see Fig. 4a).
As β increases beyond a value of approximately two
for the given configuration (see Fig. 4e, blue shading),
the distribution of mixed strategy profiles becomes het-
erogeneous for technology and non-technology users (see
Fig. 4b). For technology users the distribution shifts in
favor of route 1, whereas it shifts towards route 2 for non-
technology users (see Fig. 4c). Technology users learn to
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FIG. 4. Heterogeneous mixed strategy profiles give rise to flow separation. For β > βcrit. the distribution of mixed
strategy profiles becomes heterogeneous and the probability mass separates for technology and non-technology users. The
mixed strategy profiles of technology users are described by a bimodal distribution that exhibits peaks at pi1 = f0/N and
pi1 = 1. Thus, technology users learn to preferably choose route 1 while non-technology users evolve into selecting the route
alternative. Simulation parameters are N = 1000, T = 700, f0 = 700, α = 0.5, κ = 0.5.
preferably use the variable latency route 1, which has
sufficient capacity f0 = T to cater for T ⊂ N , while
non-technology users are displaced onto the fixed latency
route 2. With crowdsourced traffic information the distri-
bution of mixed strategy profiles becomes bimodal in this
parameter constellation. It exhibits peaks at pi1 = 1 and
pi1 = f0/N . Hence, any meanfield-type of approximation
breaks down in this regime of route choice preferences.
This dynamics is a result of the information asymme-
try between the two commuter groups: In every time step
technology users obtain traffic information about the dif-
ferent routing options, while non-technology users need
to sample the information on their own route by route,
resulting in different effective learning rates. Technol-
ogy users achieve an effective first-mover advantage and
pre-occupy the seemingly low latency route 1 while non-
technology users are still sampling the traffic observations
to decide between the different routes. Consequently,
non-technology users realize that route 1 is already oc-
cupied to capacity and becomes congested if they join in
as well. Hence, their rational choice is to select route 2
(see Supplementary Material for details).
The presence of digital routing technology effectively
turns the congestion game into a sequential move game
where technology users inherit the first mover advantage
of the digital platform operator, acting as a Stackelberg
leader. Flow separation is its macroscopic manifestation
and is rooted in heterogeneous travel time beliefs between
the two commuter groups.
Observation 3 (Externalities from crowdsourcing).
Crowdsourced route choice support does not reduce the
average travel time for the population, but may cause its
rise.
Fig. 5 illustrates the impact of crowdsourced traffic in-
formation on the equilibrium average commuting time
per person (purple) and contrasts the results to the sit-
uation where no digital technology were present (black).
In all β-regimes the average travel time responds qual-
itatively the same to a change in the latency structure
of the street network (see Fig. 5 (top row)). Upon ex-
panding the capacity f0 on route 1 travel times gener-
ally decrease in the absence of digital technology. How-
ever, assuming a fixed number of commuters to use route
choice apps (T/N = 0.7) the average travel time is always
higher than in the corresponding scenario where T = 0.
In all β-regimes the travel time rises substantially in sit-
uations where f0/T  1 and approaches the equilibrium
values for the situation without technology if f0/T  1.
Moreover, extending the capacity f0 on route 1 when it is
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FIG. 5. Impact of crowdsourced traffic information on average travel time. (top row) In situations where the number
of technology users outnumbers the available street capacity (f0  T ) the presence of crowdsourced digital decision support
leads to higher average commuting times compared to the situation without technology support (κ = 0). Shown here for
T/N = 0.7. (bottom) For given street capacity f0/N = 0.7 the average commuting time rises in the number of technology users
and β, and is always higher than for κ = 0. Technology users may realize shorter travel times compared to their non-technology
enabled fellow travelers who suffer longer average trip durations. Crowdsourced digital decision support imposes externalities.
Simulation parameters are N = 1000 and α = 0.5.
small, yields a temporary increase of the average travel
times under digital route choice support, before travel
times decrease as the capacity exceeds the number of
technology users. Crowdsourced traffic information does
not reduce congestion in these constellations, but instead
intensifies it.
Fig. 5 (bottom row) illustrates how the average travel
time per person depends on the share of technology users
for fixed street latency structure (f0/N = 0.7). In the β-
regime where there is no flow separation, the average
travel time is independent of the share of technology
users in the population (see Fig. 5 bottom left). How-
ever, as commuter flows separate for more opportunistic
route choice preferences the average travel time increases
monotonously in the number of technology users (see
Fig. 5 bottom center and right). It is always higher than
in the situation without decision support. If T  f0,
technology users realize a travel time advantage com-
pared to non-technology users in the given configura-
tion. As T ≈ f0 or T  f0 both commuter groups
face higher average travel times compared to the situ-
ation where T = 0. Consequently, crowdsourced decision
support never improves the average travel time for the
population. Only subsets of commuters benefit from the
crowdsourced traffic information, realized at the expense
of the remainder of the population. The average travel
time increment for the total population defines an exter-
nality from crowdsourcing and fuels systemic inefficien-
cies (see Supplementary Material).
Observation 4 (Informational lock-in cycle). Crowd-
sourced traffic information may prevent technology users
from unilaterally switching to low latency routes and leave
route capacity unused.
Fig. 5 (top row) illustrates how technology users may
be subject to more congestion compared to their non-
technology using fellow travelers in constellations where
f0/T  1. This inversion of travel time advantages re-
sults from an informational lock-in effect: The collective
sharing of traffic information within the group of tech-
nology users prevents unilateral switching to low latency
routes. Any discovery of faster routing options induces
collective action from all technology users, even if the
group size exceeds the route’s maximum capacity. For-
merly faster routing options become strongly congested,
forcing the commuter population to switch back to their
route alternatives. Technology users face a four-step in-
formational lock-in cycle (see Fig. 6a):
1. Emergence of low latency route: A route connect-
ing origin and destination is underutilized and en-
ables faster travel time than the alternatives.
2. Discovery of route: A technology user discovers the
low latency route and automatically shares the in-
formation with the digital platform provider. The
platform provider updates his travel time signals
and shares them with all of his subscribers.
3. Collective switch: Technology users collectively
switch to the low latency route based on the sig-
nal received from the platform provider. The route
becomes strongly congested as it is overutilized.
4. Collective backlash: Technology users learn to avoid
the route. The platform provider adapts his travel
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FIG. 6. Sharing information prevents use of low latency routes. a, In an informational lock-in cycle technology users
cannot unilaterally switch to low latency routes, illustrated here for the Pigou network. In a four step cycle commuters are forced
to switch back to a route alternative. (i) If the digital platform provider cannot crowdsource up-to-date traffic observations
he provides outdated signals, potentially deterring technology users to choose the corresponding route. (ii) A single individual
choosing the route by chance provides the required flow information and reveals that a route alternative yields attractive travel
time. (iii) The individual’s discovery is shared among all technology users and induces collective action. Technology users will
switch from route 2 to route 1 in unison. (iv) Route 1 becomes congested upon the sudden flow spike. The platform provider
adapts his signal, discourages the use of route 1, and induces a collective back-switch to route 2. b, In the simulation the
informational lock-in cycle emerges for f0/T  1 and large β. At the time corresponding to regime (i) route 1 is unused, but
technology users receive a signal τ1 > 1, discouraging to switch. At stage (ii) a single individual i ⊂ T chooses route 1, causing
an adaptation of τ1 which remains larger than τ2 owing to the learning rate α = 1/2 of the platform provider. Another single
individual j ⊂ T provides a further update on the flow along route 1 in the next time step, leading to τ1 < τ2. The next day
approx. 70% of technology users collectively switch to route 1 which becomes heavily congested. τ1 rises substantially and
technology users learn to avoid route 1. However, even non-technology users may learn to avoid the potentially faster route 1 if
they experience the heavy flow spike induced by technology users, eventually leaving route 1 unused instead of being occupied
by non-technology users.
time signals and discourages its use. In the next
game stage technology users will collectively switch
back to their routing alternatives.
In Fig. 6b we demonstrate the informational lock-in
cycle for the Pigou system with crowdsourced decision
support for f0/T = 2/7 < 1 and β = 4.5. Commuters
experience the cycle repeatedly on timescales of few hun-
dred timesteps, eventually clearing route 1 completely
independent of technology or non-technology users.
The collective phenomenon repeats on corresponding
timescales and adds spikes to the average travel time of
the population. Consequently, the population’s average
travel time rises beyond a value of one (see Fig. 5 (top
row)), even though the population chooses the fixed
latency route 2 almost exclusively.
IV. SUMMARY
Crowdsourced digital decision support can induce
different forms of collective action among technology
users, inevitably impacting the travel behavior of non-
technology users, too. In the regime of strongly op-
portunistic route choice behavior crowdsourced digital
decision support fuels selfish route choices and causes
flow splitting – the separation of technology and non-
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technology users across routes. Depending on the num-
ber of technology users within the population and the
latency structure of the street network digital decision
support causes travel time externalities. Either technol-
ogy users realize travel time advantages at the expense
of non-technology users, or they face a travel time disad-
vantage resulting from an informational lock-in effect. In
both cases, the overall travel time of the population can
only increase.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Digital routing technology has become a staple of ur-
ban commuting. In this article, we demonstrated how
smartphone-based route choice support tools impact the
collective traffic assignment in urban commuting games
under uncertainty.
By modifying congestion games under adaptive payoff-
based learning dynamics to cater for digital decision sup-
port, we illustrated how digital travel time performance
signals alter commuters’ route choice rationale, and may
thus shift macroscopic traffic flows. For collective sharing
of crowdsourced traffic observations heterogeneous travel
time beliefs emerge under certain conditions and give rise
to a separation of technology and non-technology enabled
commuter flows along different routes. As we show, col-
lective sharing of crowdsourced route choice support may
promote systemic inefficiencies and leave street capacity
unused instead of removing the externalities long-term.
To isolate the interactions induced by digital route
choice support, the above analysis is based on a mini-
mal model of day-to-day commuting dynamics. We ex-
pect similar interactions in larger networks, as the ob-
servations are driven by the different latency functions
between the fastest route and the other route options.
Technology users naturally gravitate towards the route
options with lowest latency and will either displace other
commuters (flow splitting) or enter an informational lock-
in cycle depending on the capacity of the fastest route.
On shorter timescales, dynamic adaptation of the route
choices and suggestions during trips may introduce ad-
ditional effects and may contribute to an explanation for
spontaneous formation of congestion [41, 42], for example
depending on the type and limits of the available infor-
mation.
Despite the potential negative effects of crowdsourced
traffic information, alternative protocols of digital route
choice support, aimed at reducing systemic inefficiencies,
may reallocate traffic flows towards a socially preferable
allocation across routes as well as modes of transporta-
tion. Thereby, mode-route choice support tools become
powerful demand management instruments that enable
central coordination of microscopic routing decisions,
helping, for example, to alleviate the negative socio-
economic effects of congestion-induced delays in growing
cities as urbanization accelerates [43, 44]. Routing ap-
plications have the potential to information-theoretically
realize Stackelberg routing schemes as originally pro-
posed in Refs. [40, 45]. Finding suitable algorithms and
protocols that result in socially preferable flow alloca-
tions points at important future research directions. New
types of route choice support tools will not only become
a fundamental part of Mobility-as-a-Service platforms,
but hold the potential to minimize negative social, eco-
nomic and environmental impacts of congestion in urban
commuting.
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